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Entering the DRM-Free Zone:  
An Intellectual Property and Antitrust 
Analysis of the Online Music Industry 
Monika Roth* 
Recently, EMI, the world’s third largest recording company, 
and part of the “Big Four” record labels that own and control 
almost all of the music available to American consumers, broke 
with industry practice and announced that it would no longer sell 
songs with built-in copy restrictions.  This move followed a public 
request by Steve Jobs, Chief Executive Officer of Apple, for 
recording companies to allow the sale of music online without 
antipiracy software, proclaiming that it would be the “best 
alternative for consumers.”1  Up until this point, all the major 
music companies have been selling all digital songs with copy 
restrictions.  Starting in May 2007, EMI’s music began to be sold 
through Apple’s iTunes and other online music stores at the cost of 
thirty cents extra per song ($1.29 per song rather than 99 cents).  
Eric Nicoli, EMI’s chief executive was quoted saying: “It was 
clear what we had to do because we hold the customer at the center 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2586.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2007; B.S. Industrial and Labor Relations, 
Cornell University.  I would like to thank Professor James B. Kobak, Jr. for his 
inspiration and academic guidance, the editors of the Fordham Intellectual Property, 
Media & Entertainment Law Journal for their dedication, and my sister and parents for 
their endless love and support throughout all my endeavors. 
 1 Steven Jobs, Thoughts on Music, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/ 
(Feb. 6, 2007); see also John Markoff, Apple Chief Urges Shift on Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 7, 2007, at C1 [hereinafter Apple Chief]. 
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of our focus” and “we have to trust our customers.”2  Was it the 
potential concern for its customers, and Apple’s support, that 
caused EMI to part with its long-standing business practice?  
Possibly.  However, an analysis of the history and current state of 
the online music industry presents some alternate factors that likely 
influenced the moves made by both Apple and EMI. 
Part I of this Note begins by defining copyright infringement 
and explaining its rise in the music industry with the advent of the 
internet.  Next, Part II outlines the legal complexities regarding 
copyright infringement in the music industry, and Part III 
highlights the music industry’s non-legal response to the copyright 
infringement problem. Part IV introduces the innovative solutions 
initiated by Apple to combat industry problems and Part V 
explains the antitrust issues raised by these innovative solutions. 
Part VI broadens the scope of the problems faced by Apple to the 
international playing field.  Part VII concludes that the failure of 
the music industry’s past solutions to copyright infringement may 
be the true reason that the record labels are looking at selling 
online music without copy restrictions. 
I. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND P2P NETWORKS 
The United States Copyright Act of 1976 provides that 
copyright holders have the exclusive right to authorize the 
reproduction and distribution of duplicates of copyrighted work.3  
Thus, copyright infringement occurs when copyrighted material is 
used without authorization.  The internet, while producing many 
benefits for our society, also facilitated a new realm of copyright 
infringement.  With the rise of peer-to-peer (P2P) software, it is 
relatively easy for consumers to obtain music online by sharing 
files through an autonomous network of computers without any 
 
 2 Thomas Crampton, EMI Dropping Copy Limits on Online Music, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/technology/03music.web.html [hereinafter 
EMI Dropping Copy Limits]. 
 3 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–22 (2006); see also J. Heath Loftin, Secondary Liability for 
Copyright Infringement: Why the Courts May Be Nearing the End of the Line for 
Imposing Further Liability on Peer-to-Peer Software Distributors, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 
111, 114 (2006). 
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central server.4  The software connects the hard drives of users 
with those of other users and thus creates a network.5  Once a  
network exists, an index of files can be freely exchanged among its 
users.6 
A prime reason for copyright infringement is the consumer’s 
desire to have a specific song without having to purchase the entire 
album.7  The desire for unbundled music is difficult to satisfy when 
music is distributed through compact disks (CDs).  The 
proliferation of download services has made it simpler to respond 
to consumer demand through “disaggregation.”8 
II. THE LEGAL DIMENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED ONLINE MUSIC 
DISTRIBUTION AND QUESTIONS REGARDING LIABILITY 
Copyright holders tried to combat copyright infringement by 
taking the problem to court.  Since it would be too arduous to sue 
all the individual copyright infringers, copyright holders instead 
opted to sue the designers and providers of the P2P networks for 
contributory infringement.  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc. is the seminal United States Supreme Court case 
construing contributory copyright liability.9  In Sony, owners of 
copyrights on television programs brought a copyright 
infringement action against manufacturers of home videotape 
recorders (VCRs).  The copyright owners alleged that some 
individuals had used Betamax VCRs to record copyrighted works 
played on commercially sponsored television, claiming that the 
manufacturers were liable for the copyright infringement 
committed by the consumers.10 
 
 4 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004), 
vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) [hereinafter Grokster]; see also Peer-to-peer, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer (last visited Oct. 18, 2007); File sharing, 
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_sharing (last visited Oct. 18, 2007). 
 5 Peer-to-peer, supra note 4; File sharing, supra note 4. 
 6 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158; Peer-to-peer, supra note 4; File sharing, supra note 4. 
 7 Eddy Hsu, Antitrust Regulation Applied to Problems in Cyberspace: iTunes and 
iPod, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 117, 120 (2005). 
 8 Id. 
 9 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 10 Id. at 420. 
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Relying on an analogy to patent law,11 the Supreme Court held 
that a party could not be held liable as a contributory infringer as a 
result of manufacturing and selling copying equipment like a VCR.  
If the copying device is capable of “‘substantial’ or ‘commercially 
significant noninfringing uses,’ . . . the manufacturer would not be 
liable for contributory infringement.”12  The Supreme Court held 
that the VCR was “capable of substantial noninfringing uses” since 
“the primary use of the machine for most owners was time-
shifting”13 and a “significant quantity of that time-shifting was 
expressly authorized by various broadcasters.”14  Time-shifting is 
the ability of a consumer to record a program and watch it at a later 
time. 
Meanwhile, the emerging field of P2P software raised new 
questions within copyright law.  Historically, “anyone wishing to 
publicly distribute an artistic work . . . would have to negotiate 
with the rights-holding gatekeeper . . . for permission to do so.”15  
However, P2P software programs eliminate the need for a 
gatekeeper.  The realization of this fact led many copyright holders 
to come together and bring suits against designers of these 
programs, starting with Napster.16  They deemed it less costly and 
more effective to go after the single secondary infringer rather than 
the mass of direct infringers.17  Unfortunately, the results of these 
lawsuits were “less than conclusive.”18  The uses of P2P file 
sharing systems are clearly infringing when users downloaded 
copyrighted works, but “it was not at all clear that Sony’s 
contributory liability test should support the imposition of liability 
on the designers of these programs—especially as many P2P 
programs arguably satisfied Sony’s ‘capable of substantial 
noninfringing use’ threshold.”19 
 
 11 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c) (2006). 
 12 John M. Moye, How Sony Survived: Peer-to-Peer Software, Grokster, and 
Contributory Copyright Liability in the Twenty-First Century, 84 N.C. L. REV. 646, 657 
(2006) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442). 
 13 Sony, 464 U.S. at 423. 
 14 Id. at 444. 
 15 Moye, supra note 12, at 661. 
 16 Id.; see also infra notes 20–31 and accompanying text. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 662. 
 19 Id. (italics added). 
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Contributory liability for a P2P software designer was first 
truly addressed in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.20  Through 
various tools like Napster’s MusicShare software, an internet site 
that offered the software for free, network servers and server-side 
software, Napster made it possible for users to download exact 
copies of music files stored on other users’ computers.21  In order 
to determine whether Napster was liable for contributory copyright 
infringement, the court set out two elements: (1) knowledge of the 
infringing activity and (2) material contribution to the infringing 
activity.22  Napster satisfied both elements.  Napster had 
“knowledge, both actual and constructive, of direct infringement”23 
and materially contributed by providing “the site and facilities” for 
direct infringement.24  The court clarified the Sony holding by 
stating that Sony does not impute the requisite level of knowledge 
where there is capability of substantial noninfringing uses.25  
However, since Napster had “actual, specific knowledge,” 
contributory liability was applicable, despite the existence of a 
capability for substantial noninfringing uses.26 
The Ninth Circuit approach to the Sony doctrine conflicted 
with an alternate interpretation that developed in the Seventh 
Circuit.  In the case In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,27 involving 
another P2P software provider, the court held that when there is a 
product involving both infringing and noninfringing uses, an 
estimate of the “respective magnitudes of the uses is necessary for 
a finding of contributory infringement.”28  “Construing Sony this 
way, the court held that a defendant would not be able to escape 
liability for contributory infringement merely by showing that its 
product could be used in noninfringing ways.”29  Being capable of 
 
 20 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 21 Id. at 1011. 
 22 Id. at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
 23 Id. at 1020. 
 24 Id. at 1022 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
 25 Id. at 1020. 
 26 Id. 
 27 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004). 
 28 Id. at 649; see also Moye, supra note 12, at 667. 
 29 Moye, supra note 12, at 667. 
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noninfringing uses is not enough to escape liability; a defendant 
must show that the product was used for substantial noninfringing 
uses.30 
The split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits over the 
interpretation of the Sony doctrine caused a change in strategy in 
the recording industry.  Injunctions against P2P systems were 
abandoned in favor of pursuing individual lawsuits against direct 
infringers.31  However, this approach, besides being expensive and 
time-consuming, backfired.  Rather than stirring public sympathy 
for the industry, it had the reverse effect of demonizing the parties 
bringing the suits, such as the Recording Industry Association of 
America and the copyright holders they represented.32 
The Supreme Court finally tackled the P2P debate in the wake 
of the Sony doctrine in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.33  A 
group of movie studios and other copyright holders brought a 
copyright infringement suit against distributors of a P2P file 
sharing computer networking software.34  The distributors were 
aware that their software was used to download copyrighted files, 
but the decentralized networks did not reveal which files were 
copied and when they were copied.35  Evidence suggested that the 
the distributors intentionally structured their networks to 
circumvent the centralized control that had led to Napster’s 
demise.36  There was also evidence that the distributors “took 
active steps to encourage infringement” and promoted and 
marketed themselves as Napster alternatives.37  Furthermore, the 
distributors took no steps to filter copyrighted material or 
otherwise prevent the sharing of copyrighted files.38  The incentive 
to refrain from regulating the downloading of files was financial; 
the distributors made money by selling advertising space, and 
 
 30 Id. at 667–68; Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651–53, 648. 
 31 Moye, supra note 12, at 671–72. 
 32 See id. 
 33 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 34 Id. at 913. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Moye, supra note 12, at 664–65. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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revenues increased the more the software was used.39  All of these 
factors showed that the “principal object” of the business models 
of the distributors was to use their software to download 
copyrighted works,40 and thus an unlawful objective was 
“unmistakable.”41  The theoretical basis for this conclusion was 
expressed by the Supreme Court in “the rule on inducement of 
infringement.”42  According to the inducement rule, “one who 
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of 
infringement by third parties.”43  Consequently, due to the factors 
of intent “to bring about infringement and distribution of a device 
suitable for infringing use”44 present in this case, the Supreme 
Court held that contributory liability was applicable. 
The inducement theory articulated in Grokster still leaves 
many issues open.  “For example, is such a theory intended to now 
supplement the already-familiar Sony doctrine, simply by 
incorporating into it considerations of intent and purpose?”45  Or, 
“alternatively, should a lower court now completely forgo the 
‘capable of substantial noninfringing uses’ analysis where the 
evidentiary record is replete with references to ‘affirmative steps’ 
taken to infringe?”46  These questions will only be answered with 
time as lower courts begin applying the opinion to new copyright 
liability cases.  However, “considering the amount of money at 
stake (Grokster, for example agreed to ‘pay up $50 million in 
damages’), it is extremely important that P2P networks have some 
sense of their potential liability in a case where no inducement 
exists, and what they could and should do to avoid such liability.  
The Grokster opinion is not instructive on this point . . . .”47  Thus, 
 
 39 Id. at 913. 
 40 Id. at 926. 
 41 Id. at 940. 
 42 Id. at 936. 
 43 Id. at 936–37. 
 44 Id. at 940. 
 45 Moye, supra note 12, at 679. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Julie Zankel, A Little Help With Sharing: A Mandatory Licensing Proposal to 
Resolve the Unanswered Question Surrounding Peer-to-Peer Liability for Contributory 
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it is understandable that the music industry has begun to explore 
new technologies that protect copyrighted media, such as digital 
rights management (DRM). 
III. DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 
With the rise of technology such as the cassette tape recorder, 
photocopying equipment, the VCR, and most recently, P2P 
networks, copying media has become a lot easier.  It is now more 
difficult to protect legal rights that had been previously enforced 
through technological barriers.48  The introduction of digital media 
has raised more concerns because, unlike the case with analog 
media, digital media files can be copied infinitely without a 
corresponding loss in quality.  As a result, copyright holders have 
turned to DRM as a method for protecting their copyrights.  DRM 
gives copyright holders the right to control the making of copies by 
incorporating technology with use restrictions.49  Unfortunately, as 
the case of Sony and others has proven, DRM has proven to 
present many obstacles of its own. 
Sony implemented a type of DRM when it began to sell CDs  
with “built in copy protection designed to prevent illegal copying 
between computers by forbidding a second computer from playing 
the music without an additional purchase.”50 This solution may 
sound clever but it came with numerous problems, including the 
requirement that the first computer have an internet connection and 
online registration by the owner.  These technological obstacles 
created a consumer backlash. 
Sony used two different encryption systems, XCP and 
MediaMax.51  An unencrypted CD allows the computer to copy 
and store the music files on a computer.52  XCP and MediaMax, 
 
Copyright Infringement in the Wake of Grokster, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 189, 191 (2006) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 48 Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management, 5 J. TELECOMMS. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 47, 49 (2006). 
 49 See Digital Rights Management, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Digital_rights_management (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). 
 50 Hsu, supra note 7, at 119. 
 51 Picker, supra note 48, at 56. 
 52 Id. at 57–58. 
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however, work differently.53  According to Ed Felton, a computer 
scientist at Princeton University and Alex Halderman, his graduate 
student, both types of DRM take advantage of the autorun feature 
built into the Windows operating system that simplifies the 
installation of new software.54  When autorun is enabled and a CD 
with DRM is inserted, the software on the CD is triggered.  This 
software blocks “normal copying of the CD and can impose an 
end-user license agreement that limits access by the computer to 
the CD.”55  However, according to Felten and Halderman, a 
knowledgeable computer user can avoid the DRM systems by 
turning off autorun.56 
Beyond the technical obstacles of the encryption systems, Sony 
has also been presented with some legal issues.  For example, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed a class action lawsuit 
under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act alleging: (i) 
unfair, unlawful and fraudulent business practices in violation of 
California Business and Professions Code Section 17200; (ii) 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and 
(iii) false or misleading statements under California Business and 
Professions Code 17500.57  Additionally, the State Attorney 
Generals of Massachusetts and New York launched investigations 
stemming from Sony sales and the Texas Attorney General 
brought suit under the Texas Consumer Protection Against 
Computer Spyware Act of 2005.58  Although the legal sufficiency 
of some of these claims may be doubtful59 they nevertheless 
indicate increased costs and trouble for Sony.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that Sony was willing to settle the EFF lawsuit and 
cease using encryption systems in the sale of CDs.60 
 
 53 Id. at 58. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id at 60. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 60–61. 
 59 See id. at 61 (explaining the true purpose of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). 
 60 See id. at 62. 
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IV. THE APPLE APPROACH TO DRM 
Apple’s solution to the problems facing the online music 
industry and the music industry in general is iTunes.61  iTunes 
allows consumers to download songs individually or as albums.62  
The online store eliminates CD production costs, so songs and 
albums are less expensive and available on demand.63 
Probably the most significant aspect of iTunes is that it 
addresses online music piracy and provides a new revenue option 
by selling copyrighted music over the internet.64  A song purchased 
through iTunes is downloaded to a destination computer and 
comes encoded with the Advanced Audio Coding (“AAC”) codec, 
copying technology based on MPEG-4 digital compression 
technology.65  According to Apple, “AAC provides audio encoding 
that compresses much more efficiently than earlier formats such as 
MP3, yet delivers quality rivaling that of uncompressed CD 
audio.”66 
Before downloading the song, the consumer must agree to the 
iTunes “Terms of Service,” which include “usage rules limiting the 
number of times the music may be burned into CDs, the number of 
devices which can simultaneously store the downloaded music and 
an acknowledgement that the purchased music is encrypted to 
prevent violation of the usage terms,”67 in addition to the right by 
Apple to limit or stop access to downloaded music if iTunes is 
discontinued.68  All of these restrictions that the user must agree to 
allow Apple to limit the distribution of downloaded music. 
While iTunes can be viewed as an effective way to deal with 
copyright infringement, the real issues arise after the music is 
purchased.  Naturally, consumers might want to listen to their 
 
 61 See Hsu, supra note 7, at 120. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 120–21. 
 64 See id. at 121. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. (citing iTunes: About Advanced Audio Coding (AAC), 
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=93012 (last visited Apr. 16, 2006)). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
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downloaded music on other devices besides their computers.69  The 
digital audio compression format, such as MP3 and AAC, allows 
consumers to listen to mass quantities of music on very small 
portable music players.70 However, in selecting a portable music 
player or any other type of music-playing device, the consumer is 
limited by the iTunes Terms of Service, which only allows for five 
Apple-authorized devices at a time and the Apple iPod as the only 
portable music player.71  Thus, when shopping around for a 
portable music player, the consumer is limited to just one, the iPod, 
the only player licensed by Apple to play music securely encoded 
with Apple’s AAC codec.72  “Furthermore, if iTunes should cease 
its service, the iPod will be the only way to continue to hear AAC 
encoded music outside of the original computer used to download 
the purchased music.”73  This close link that AAC encoded music 
creates between iTunes and the iPod triggers antitrust concerns.74 
 
V. ANTITRUST LAW AND TYING VIOLATIONS 
The purpose of antitrust law is to promote competition.75 
Technological innovation can challenge that purpose because it 
enables competitors to produce a product that is technologically 
incompatible with the rest of the marketplace.76  If several 
competitors do the same thing, the benefits of the increase in 
competition is counteracted with “a fractured market of non-
compliant standards, which ultimately leads to consumer 
frustration.  Consumers buy incompatible devices, waste time by 
trying to make devices compatible, and lose money in the 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id. 
 71 Id. at 121–22. 
 72 Id. at 122 (citing iTunes 4: About Third-party Music Players and AAC File Support, 
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=93032 (last visited Apr. 16, 2006)). 
 73 Id. (citing iTunes Music Store Terms of Service, http://www.apple.com/support/ 
itunes/legal/terms.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2006)). 
 74 Id. 
 75 See id. 
 76 Id. 
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process.”77  Furthermore, if competitors want to agree on standards 
they must proceed with caution to avoid a violation of the Sherman 
Act, which can result in treble damages or criminal charges.78  The 
Sherman Act was enacted as “a comprehensive charter of 
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered 
competition as the rule of trade.  It rests on the premise that the 
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best 
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest 
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time 
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our 
democratic political and social institutions.”79  Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies 
among competitors that unreasonably restrain competition.80 
Section 2 punishes anyone who attempts or obtains an unlawful 
monopoly.81 
A. Tying Arrangements 
The Supreme Court has defined a tying arrangement as “an 
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition 
that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at 
least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other 
supplier.”82  Thus, tying arrangements suppress competition by 
denying competitors free access to the market for the tied product, 
“not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better 
product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in 
 
 77 Id. at 123 (footnotes omitted). 
 78 See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 309 (2007). 
 79 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 80 Id. at 4–5; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (“Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
 81 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with other person or persons, to monopolize any part 
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of 
the court.”); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
459 (1992). 
 82 N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 5–6. 
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another market.  At the same time buyers are forced to forego their 
free choice between competing products.”83 
Tying arrangements, agreements between the consumer and the 
tying company for exclusive dealing, violate both § 1 and § 2 of 
the Sherman Act.  It is a § 1 violation because the agreement 
excludes competition from the market.84  The monopolistic power 
of the tying company is a § 2 violation because the tying company 
unnecessarily restrains competition in the tied product.85  Although 
both parties participate in the agreement, only the tying company is 
punished for the violation because the consumer has no power to 
resist and thus cannot be guilty of a tie.86 
A tying arrangement is established upon the showing that: “(1) 
the tying arrangement is between two distinct products or services, 
(2) the defendant has sufficient economic power in the tying 
market to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for 
the tied product, and (3) a not insubstantial amount of interstate 
commerce is affected.”87 
In the past, a tying arrangement has been a “per se” violation.88  
“Per se” violations are agreements or practices “which because of 
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming 
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have 
caused or the business excuse for their use.”89  A “per se” violation 
“avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged 
economic investigation into the entire history of the industry 
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at 
large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable . . . .”90 
 
 83 Id. 
 84 Hsu, supra note 7, at 123. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. One v. First Condo Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 
207 (7th Cir. 1985); see also N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 7–8 (noting a defendant’s economic 
power and its purpose to “stifle competition” in determining a violation of the Sherman 
Act). 
 88 See N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 5; Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) 
abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
 89 N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 5. 
 90 Id. 
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Recent cases such as United States v. Microsoft Corp. and 
Jefferson Parish Hospital District. v. Hyde  state that a tying 
violation is just a presumed Sherman Act violation and may be 
rebuttable under a “rule of reason” analysis.91  However, Microsoft 
Corp. was settled before ever reaching the Supreme Court, so the 
issue of whether a “rule of reason” analysis should be applied in 
tying arrangements is still unresolved.92  Although not the majority 
rule, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Jefferson Parish does 
mention that “[t]he time has therefore come to abandon the ‘per se’ 
label and refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and 
the potential economic benefits, that the tie may have.”93  Justice 
O’Connor’s reasoning was that “[i]n practice, a tie has been illegal 
only if the seller is shown to have ‘sufficient economic power with 
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition 
in the market for the tied product . . . .’”94  Control or dominance 
over the tying product is necessary for it to be “an effectual 
weapon” to pressure buyers into taking the tied product; otherwise 
any “restraint of trade” attributable to such tying arrangements 
would be “insignificant.”95  Furthermore “[t]he [Supreme] Court 
has never been willing to say of tying arrangements . . . that they 
are always illegal, without proof of market power or 
anticompetitive effect.”96 
B. iPod and iTunes: A Tying Arrangement? 
The tie between Apple’s iTunes and iPod may not be initially 
obvious because a subscription to iTunes does not require an iPod 
 
 91 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 44–55 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2003), as recognized in Tex. 
Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai Elec. Indus., Co. Ltd., 49 F. Supp. 2d 893, 908 (E.D. Tex. 
1999); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 92 See The Microsoft Settlement: A Look to the Future: Statement Before S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney 
General, Antitrust Division), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/ 
9681.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2007). 
 93 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 94 Id. at 34 (quoting N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 6). 
 95 N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 6. 
 96 Id. 
ROTH_121307_FINAL 12/13/2007  10:16:43 PM 
2008] IP, ANTITRUST & THE ONLINE MUSIC INDUSTRY 529 
purchase.97  Nevertheless, a tying analysis is not foreclosed for this 
reason.  Courts have found tying arrangement claims even when 
they arise subsequent to the purchase of a service or product by a 
consumer.98  For example, in Microsoft, the court found a tying 
claim existed between the Internet Explorer browser and the 
Windows operating system.99  This tie would only be noticed by a 
consumer that attempted to get on the internet or tried to get 
another browser.100 Additionally, in Jefferson Parrish, a tying 
claim was found because a hospital allowed only limited choices of 
anesthesiologists.101  However, to discover these limited choices a 
patient would need their services. “In both cases, the courts 
recognized that the tie existed before deciding whether the tie was 
illegal.”102  Therefore, a court may find that a tying arrangement 
between iTunes and the iPod exists before initiating an analysis of 
the legality of such an arrangement. 
1. Two Distinct Products 
iTunes and the iPod are two distinct products with different 
competitors that are founded in a consumer’s desire for music.  
iTunes is an online music store whose competitors include “MSN 
Music, Napster (revamped since the lawsuits), MusicNow, 
MusicMatch, Wal-Mart, f.y.e., PureTracks and audible.com.”103  
“Each competitor has its own subscription agreement and pricing 
strategy.”104  Prices for an individual song are generally $0.99, 
which means that competitors must adopt alternate strategies to 
attract customers.  The iPod is a portable music device that 
competes with other consumer product manufacturers such as 
“Sony, Philips, Creative, iRiver, Archos, Pogo, Interactive Media, 
 
 97 See iPod + iTunes, Apple, http://www.apple.com/itunes (iTunes is a program that 
may be downloaded separately from any Apple purchase). 
 98 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 99 Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 88–89. 
 100 Hsu, supra note 7, at 125. 
 101 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 30–31. 
 102 Hsu, supra note 7, at 125. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
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and Samsung.”105  The portable music players provided by these 
manufacturers must compete based on “capacity, size, battery life, 
looks, and compatibility with several music formats.”106  The iPod 
has been said to be one of the “worst in battery life, the most 
expensive and the least compatible with other music formats.”107 
The Supreme Court has ruled that for two products to be 
considered distinct there must be sufficient consumer demand so 
that it is efficient for a firm to provide each separately.108  “The 
presence of different competitors in the iTunes market and the iPod 
market strongly infers that Apple has two distinct products because 
each market must have their own strategies based on price and 
product development.”109  Furthermore, a subscriber of iTunes 
does not need an iPod to listen to the music.  However, once a 
portable music player is desired, that iTunes subscriber must 
purchase an iPod.  Thus, the purchase of the iPod occurs because 
of the AAC-secured format rather than a desire for the product 
enhancement of iTunes.110  The iTunes subscription is the tying 
product because the AAC-encoded music it provides prevents the 
consumer from freely choosing other portable music players.  The 
iPod is the tied product since a consumer that is not an iTunes 
subscriber is free to purchase any available online music player.  
Without the existence of the AAC-secured format, iTunes and the 
iPod could be sold and marketed independently. 
2. Sufficient Economic Power 
“Market power is the power ‘to force a purchaser to do 
something that he would not do in a competitive market.’”111  “It 
has been defined as ‘the ability of a single seller to raise price and 
 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. (citing Elliot Van Buskirk, Five reasons not to buy an iPod, CNET REVIEWS, 
Nov. 5, 2003, http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-6450_7-5102324-1.html (last visited Oct. 18, 
2007)). 
 108 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 642 (1992).(citing 
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21–22). 
 109 Hsu, supra note 7, at 126. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464 (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14). 
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restrict output.’”112  “The existence of such power ordinarily is 
inferred from the seller’s possession of a predominant share of the 
market.”113 
A glance at the online music industry reveals the market 
dominance enjoyed by Apple.  iTunes has more than seventy 
percent of the market for downloaded music,114 and Apple’s iPod 
players and iTunes Store are said to “have defined the online music 
market.”115  Additionally, Apple’s iPod accounts for approximately 
seventy-eight percent of all sales of portable music players.116 
In Eastman Kodak, the plaintiffs argued that “Kodak’s control 
over the parts market . . . excluded service competition, boosted 
service prices and forced unwilling consumption of Kodak 
service.”117  Evidence of increased prices and excluded 
competition imply the existence of market power.118  Claims of the 
iPod’s inferiority to other portable music players119 and Apple’s 
obstruction to competition with the iPod through the use of AAC 
encoded music similarly imply market power (leading to unwilling 
consumption). 
Furthermore, the presence of other competitors does not 
preclude a finding of market dominance.  In Eastman Kodak, 
Kodak argued for the adoption of a legal rule that would proclaim 
that “equipment competition precludes any finding of monopoly 
power in derivative aftermarkets.”120  However, the Supreme Court 
ruled that it prefers to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case 
basis with a focus on the particular facts on record:121 “In 
determining the existence of market power, and specifically the 
 
 112 Id. (quoting Fortner Enter. v. U.S. Steel, 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)). 
 113 Id. (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17). 
 114 See EMI Dropping Copy Limits, supra note 2. 
 115 Apple Chief, supra note 1. 
 116 Christopher Sprigman, The 99 Cent Question, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 87, 
111 n.31. (2006) (citing MacNN, Apple’s Music Biz, iPod Shares Grow (Apr. 20, 2006), 
available at http://www.macnn.com/articles/06/04/20/apples.music.business (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2007)). 
 117 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 465. 
 118 See id. at 469. 
 119 See Hsu, supra note 7, at 126. 
 120 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 33). 
 121 Id. at 467. 
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responsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes of the 
other [the Supreme Court] has examined closely the economic 
reality of the market at issue.”122  The Supreme Court went on to 
rule that “[t]he fact that the equipment market imposes a restraint 
on prices in the aftermarkets by no means disproves the existence 
of power in those markets.”123  Similarly, in the case of the tie 
between iTunes and the iPod, the tie inhibits competition in iPod 
pricing because of the lack of substitutes in the iTunes aftermarket. 
Additionally, Kodak argued that “supracompetitive prices in 
the service market lead to ruinous losses in equipment 
sales . . . .”124  One of the counter-arguments that the Court used to 
undermine this theory was that the costliness of switching products 
would induce consumers to tolerate some level of price increase.125  
A comparable argument can be made in the case of Apple since 
once an investor has invested the time, money and resources in 
obtaining an iTunes subscription, he/she will be willing to tolerate 
higher prices for iPods as a result of the increasing cost of 
switching online music providers. 
3. Not Insubstantial Amount of Interstate Commerce 
The “non insubstantial” language was chosen by the Supreme 
Court because the Court did not want de minimis damage amounts 
to be alleged.  But the Court also did not require a substantial 
“volume of commerce” to “determine[e] whether the amount of 
commerce foreclosed is too insubstantial to warrant prohibition of 
the practice.”126  Rather, the Court held that “the relevant figure is 
the total volume of sales tied by the sales policy under 
challenge . . . .”127 
The iPod costs between $79 and $349,128 and over 100 million 
have been sold.129  If Apple artificially increased the price per iPod 
 
 122 Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
 123 Id. at 471. 
 124 Id. at 476. 
 125 See id. 
 126 Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1969). 
 127 Id. at 502. 
 128 iPod + iTunes, Apple, http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
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by five percent then Apple’s tying practices would result in a 
multi-million dollar gain.  Thus, the amount of commerce involved 
is clearly not insubstantial.  Furthermore, since iTunes and the iPod 
are both available over the Internet and can be accessed/purchased 
from any state, the interstate commerce requirement is easily met. 
C. Antitrust Violations: “Per Se” Rule and Rule of Reason 
Analysis 
After a tying arrangement is established, it is necessary to 
explore whether the tie violates the Sherman Act or any other 
antitrust laws.  Although traditionally tying arrangements have 
been considered “per se” violations,130 there have been recent 
movements towards a rule of reason analysis.131  Thus, the strength 
of the iTunes/iPod tying arrangement should be evaluated under 
both rules. 
1. “Per Se” Rule 
The tying arrangement is a “per se” violation because it leaves 
consumers privy to inefficient pricing in the iPod market.132  
Apple’s offense begins when it encourages the purchase of music 
through iTunes but restricts how it can be played and the options of 
portable music devices available to consumers, allowing Apple to 
charge higher prices for iPods.133 
iTunes draws customers with a music collection that has the 
greatest market dominance134 and is larger than any other music 
download service.135 Once the consumer makes a purchase, he/she 
is subject to the terms of the iTunes user agreement and becomes 
the owner of AAC-encoded music files.  These two features limit 
 
 129 Apple Press Release, 100 Million Ipods Sold, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/ 
2007/04/09ipod.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
 130 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Int’l Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 
U.S. 392 (1947). 
 131 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 132 See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 7, at 128. 
 133 E.g., id. at 128–32. 
 134 See EMI Dropping Copy Limits, supra note 2. 
 135 Sprigman, supra note 116, at 94 (displaying a comparison chart of the available 
content, pricing, and terms of service for the ten largest paid music download services). 
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where the music can be played (five approved devices) and what 
kind of device it can be played on (in the case of portable music 
players, the iPod).136 
When entering the online music market, Apple was faced with 
the challenge of satisfying two opposing laws: the approval of time 
shifting in the Sony137 case and the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (“DMCA”).138  “In Sony, the Court allowed the copying of TV 
shows to Betamax tapes because the shows were originally free to 
watch and no real loss was incurred by the copyright owners.”139  
Meanwhile, the DMCA bans the circumvention of electronic 
access controls for copyrighted materials.  Consumers, of course, 
will want to “space-shift” their music onto other devices.  In other 
words, consumers want the freedom and flexibility of listening to 
their music on various devices.  However, “[d]efendants in DMCA 
violation suits have consistently lost when copyrighted music has 
been shifted to another medium.”140  Thus, Apple allows 
consumers to “space-shift” music to alternate devices but limits the 
number of times a consumer can do so in order to create a 
contractual allowance to the DMCA.141 
Each time a consumer wants to space-shift a music collection, 
the new device must be registered to the Apple iTunes server.142  
The registration requirement is essentially an enforcement 
technique that ensures that the consumer complied with limits on 
space-shifting.  iPods are excepted from this general rule because 
iPods do not need to be registered.  Although the terms of the user 
agreement provide that a consumer will not share music on more 
than five devices, there is no technological enforcement in the case 
of the iPod.143  The special treatment given to iPods makes it 
possible for an iTunes customer to share his/her songs with an 
 
 136 Hsu, supra note 7, at 128–29. 
137 Sony Corp., of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). 
 138 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999) 
 139 Hsu, supra note 7, at 129 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (1984)). 
 140 Id. at 129, n.84 (summarizing case law from the 9th Cir. and S.D.N.Y. holding file 
sharing in violation of the DMCA). 
 141 Id. at 129. 
 142 Id. (citing iTunes 4: About Music Store Authorization and Deauthorization, 
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=93014 (last visited Mar. 10, 2005)). 
 143 See Hsu, supra note 7, at 129–30, n.87. 
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unlimited number of iPods.  Even though the consumer may share 
songs infinitely, artists are only compensated once, and, thus, a 
copyright infringement is born. 
a) Comparison with Kodak 
In the Kodak case, Kodak implemented policies that limited the 
availability of replacement parts to independent service 
organizations (ISOs), making it more difficult for them to compete 
with Kodak in servicing Kodak machines.144  The ISOs brought an 
antitrust action against Kodak for unlawfully tying the sale of 
service for Kodak machines to the sale of parts (a § 1 Sherman Act 
violation) and unlawfully monopolizing and attempting to 
monopolize, the sale of service for Kodak machines (a § 2 
Sherman Act violation).145 
The Supreme Court ruled that “service and parts are separate 
markets” and that Kodak has the “‘power to control prices or 
exclude competition’ in service and parts.”146  Thus, Kodak created 
an illegal tie between services and parts in violation of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.  A Sherman Act § 2 violation requires a showing of 
“a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly 
power.”147  The Court held that “Kodak took exclusionary action to 
maintain its parts monopoly and used its control over parts to 
strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service market.”148 
Similarly, in the case of the iTunes/iPod tying arrangement, 
there is a substantial argument to be made that the measure taken 
by Apple in the form of barring the purchase of other portable 
music players by iTunes subscribers through the use of the AAC 
code format also reflects a willful scheme to acquire/maintain 
monopoly power.  No one can compete with the iPod among 
iTunes subscribers because of the incompatibility between the 
AAC encoded music and other portable music players.  The 
exclusion of all other portable music players mandates the 
purchase of an iPod if a consumer wants to listen to music on a 
 
 144 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 458 (1992). 
 145 Id. at 459. 
 146 Id. at 481. 
 147 Id. at 483. 
 148 Id. 
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portable music player.  This requirement is analogous to the tying 
arrangement in Kodak “where a consumer would not purchase 
competing service contracts after buying the Kodak bundled parts 
and service contract because of the extra costs incurred to buy a 
useless service contract. . . . [A]n iTunes consumer will not 
purchase a non-iPod because the purchase will be useless to the 
consumer.”149  As a result of the tying arrangement, Apple can 
“leverage the iTunes monopoly to create a greater market share for 
the iPod.”150  Thus, Apple should be subject to liability under the 
Sherman Act. 
2. Rule of Reason 
a) Economic Benefits 
The rule of reason test paves way for courts to consider 
economic benefits as well as the adverse economic effects of the 
tying arrangement in comparison to the emphasis of the “per se” 
rules on the anti-competitive result.  In Microsoft, the defendants 
argued that the tying arrangement/integration is beneficial to 
consumers because choices are not reduced and consumers gain 
from the integration of added functionality into platform 
software:151 “Since consumers could still choose other browsers 
and the Windows OS was enhanced by the Internet Explorer 
integration, the court remanded the case for deeper analysis of the 
competitive loss borne by the consumers compared to the benefit 
gained by integration.”152 
Apple has many arguments that can support the existence of 
economic benefits to the consumer that stem from the iTunes/iPod 
tying arrangements.  First of all, it presents a solution to the 
copyright infringement problem of illegal downloading that 
plagues the online music industry.  Through the AAC code format, 
iTunes limits the space-shifting of music to five devices.  
Additionally, “[u]nlimited iPod transfers do not disrupt the AAC 
 
 149 Hsu, supra note 7, at 131. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 152 Hsu, supra note 7, at 133 (citing Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 94–95). 
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encoded security measures.”153  When music is transferred to an 
iPod it is encoded with the AAC format, and to transfer it back 
onto another device that device must be registered: “Thus the iPod 
is harmonized with iTunes’ security measures because a consumer 
gets to download music to a portable player and copyright 
infringement is stopped at the iPod.”154  A scheme of “legitimate 
sharing of music” is created.155 
Secondly, Apple can argue that consumers benefit from the 
AAC code format because it ensures that artists receive royalties 
and therefore have an incentive to continue creating and producing 
music.156  On the flip side, the consumers have accepted this form 
of copyright law compliance.  Given the popularity of iTunes and 
the iPod it can be argued that the tying arrangement has produced a 
solution that is legally compliant and makes the consumers happy. 
Lastly, there are other options that exist for consumers.  
Consumers can, for example, burn the AAC encoded music onto 
CDs and play it on CD players.157  Also, if the prices for the iTunes 
service were truly non-competitive consumers have other 
competitors from whom they can opt to purchase music and 
portable music players.158 
Apple can approach the tying arrangement claim from a 
different angle by arguing for a broader definition of the market to 
refute the notion that it has sufficient market power (the second 
element of a tying arrangement claim).  Digital music accounts for 
only about ten percent of the music industry as a whole, or about 
$2 billion of the industry’s sales in 2006.159  The iTunes store has 
an even smaller share of that.  Thus, in the context of the music 
industry, Apple barely has the power to induce customers to 
purchase iPods. 
 
 153 Hsu, supra note 7, at 133. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. at 134. 
 158 See id. 
 159 See EMI Dropping Copy Limits, supra note 2. 
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b) Justification 
The rule of reason requires pro-competitive justifications for 
anticompetitive behavior.160  When the iPod was first released it 
could not play music that was not encoded with the AAC code 
format well.161  The continuation of this practice would violate the 
rule of reason because there is no benefit from limiting the 
consumer from playing music without the AAC code format; “[it 
took] away the usefulness of non-AAC music without giving 
anything back to society.”162  Thus, Apple made the iPod 
compatible with most other codec formats.  However, the iPod is 
still incompatible with the Microsoft Windows Music Audio 
Codec (“WMA”) which is the standard used on Microsoft’s 
Windows Media Player, the default media player on the Windows 
operating system.163  Apple goes so far as to encourage the 
conversion of WMA files into AAC files knowing that once the 
conversion is complete only the iPod can play the AAC files. By 
forgoing a competitor’s standards to use the iPod, the iTunes/iPod 
tying arrangement is reinforced to the benefit of Apple and to no 
benefit to the consumer (besides the labor of conversion).164 
It is argued that if Apple fixed the incompatibility issue or 
allowed other portable music players to play AAC encoded music, 
then the iTunes/iPod tying arrangement would be legal under a rule 
of reason test.165  The reasoning is as follows: “iTunes customers 
would no longer be forced to buy the iPod” and the “consumer 
would gain the benefits of having an integrated product without the 
restriction on their choice of portable music players.”166 
VI. INTERNATIONAL BACKLASH TO APPLE’S SOLUTION 
Consumer organizations in several European countries have 
expressed discontent over the fact that the AAC encoded files 
 
 160 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 161 See Hsu, supra note 7, at 134. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See id. 
 164 See id. at 134–35. 
 165 See id. at 135. 
 166 Id. 
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purchased on iTunes can only be played on iPods.167  In January 
2007, a Consumer Ombudsman in Norway agreed with a 
complaint filed on the matter on behalf of the Norwegian 
Consumer Council.  Apple’s response was due by March 1, 2007, 
and it has until October 1, 2007, to remedy the situation: “The 
Ombudsman has also backed the Consumer Council’s claim that 
the DRM technology is not simply a copy protection scheme.  The 
Council had argued that in restricting consumers’ use of music so 
heavily the technology broke contract law in Norway.”168 
Admittedly, Norway is a small market, but more significantly, 
Norway’s complaint has been echoed in other European countries, 
including France, Germany and the Netherlands.169 According to 
Mark Mulligan, an analyst at Jupiter Research, “Apple can see that 
the legislative tide is turning in Europe. . . . To U.S. readers it 
might seem strange to be so concerned about consumer group 
actions in little markets like Norway, which have just four million 
inhabitants.  But this is all about precedents and other markets 
following suit.”170  Thus, Apple’s iPod/iTunes tying arrangement 
has already begun to cause some international legal problems and, 
if the tie continues, promises to create more in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
When EMI announced that it would offer DRM-free music, 
and that the music would be available on iTunes, a Wall Street 
Journal reporter said “a major label is finally treating its customers 
like customers, instead of regarding them as likely shoplifters who 
should be given as few rights as possible.”171  While there may be 
some truth to that statement, this paper presents alternate reasons 
that probably influenced EMI’s decision.  These alternatives 
 
 167 See Eric Pfanner, Europe Cool to Apple’s Suggestions on Music, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/08/technology/08music.html. 
 168 Apple DRM Illegal in Norway: Ombudsman, REGISTER, Jan. 24, 2007, available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/24/apple_drm_illegal_in_norway. 
 169 See Pfanner, supra note 167. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Jason Fry, A Changing Map for Digital Music, WALL ST. J. Apr. 9, 2007, available 
at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB117579460306061099-pDg6mCZljJVPz_Udzot 
m9C2hOcA_20070509.html. 
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encompass different approaches to making music available to 
consumers online and the problems faced by each of them.  Given 
the failure of free P2P networks, the difficulties faced by DRM, 
and antitrust issues regarding Apple’s iTunes/iPod, it is not 
surprising that a new development has been made in the music 
industry in the sale of online files.  Furthermore, a move towards 
DRM-free online music would help lift Apple out of the legal 
trouble it faces regarding the iTunes/iPod link in some countries, 
and the potential legal claims it could face in others (including an 
antitrust claim under United States law as explored above).  It can 
be argued that the mounting legal, both copyright and antitrust, 
problems faced by the music industry forced the powerful players 
in the industry, such as EMI and Apple, to consider new, 
innovative solutions.  Hopefully, after years of exploration in 
varying approaches and constant uncertainty, a viable solution that 
successfully balances the competing interests of various parties has 
emerged. 
